A designated verifier signature convinces only the specific recipient of the message of its integrity and origin. Following the notion of aggregate signature introduced by Boneh et al. in [3], we introduce in this work the notion of aggregate designated verifier signature. After defining the protocols and the security model for such schemes, we give a general construction which is based on message authentication codes, and that can be extended to an identitybased scenario. The resulting schemes are proved to be secure under the CDH assumption, in the random oracle model. They are much more efficient than standard aggregate signature schemes, at the price of loosing some properties of standard signatures, in particular non-repudiation.
Introduction
Ensuring the integrity and the authenticity of the origin of a message is one of the goals of cryptography. This can be achieved by several authentication tools. For example, in a symmetric cryptography scenario, one can use message authentication codes to produce symmetric signatures; both processes of signing and verifying depend on a common secret key that the signer and the verifier must share. This method has three potential drawbacks: (1) signer and receiver must securely agree on a common secret key; (2) only the receiver is able to verify the validity of a signature, i.e. there is no universal verification; (3) a signer can repudiate having produced a signature, since the recipient who knows the common key is also able to produce such a signature. If these problems are to be avoided, then we must consider a scenario of asymmetric cryptography. There, standard authentication tools are digital signatures: the signer uses his secret key to compute signatures, which can be verified by anybody knowing the signer's public key.
Designated verifier signatures are in some way a combination of symmetric and asymmetric signatures: they run in a public key environment, and therefore no secure and prior agreement on a common secret key is necessary. Otherwise, designated verifier signatures behave exactly as symmetric ones: a signer A computes a signature which can be verified only by a user B, designated by A. Usually, the designated verifier is also able to produce such a signature. Therefore, resulting signatures do not satisfy the properties of universal verification and non-repudiation. In other words, designated verifier signatures make sense in situations where the integrity and origin of a message is only incumbent upon a specific user, who does not need to pass his conviction to anyone else. In such situations, symmetric or designated verifier signatures are preferable to standard (asymmetric) digital signatures, because they can be implemented in a really more efficient way, as we will see later in this paper.
On the other hand, there are applications which need to manage a large number of signatures on different messages signed by possibly different entities. Reducing the amount of memory required to store these signatures and the computational time required to verify their validity was the motivation for the concept of aggregate signatures [3] . An aggregate signature is obtained from n different initial signatures, ideally in such a way that: (1) the length of the aggregate signature is smaller than the sum of the length of the n initial signatures; (2) verifying the correctness of the aggregate signature costs less than verifying the n initial signatures one by one. If an aggregate signature is verified as valid, then the receiver is convinced that the n initial signatures were valid. On the other hand, if the aggregate signature is invalid, the receiver is convinced that some initial signature was not valid, but he cannot detect which was the invalid one.
Our contributions In this work we introduce the notion of aggregate designated verifier signature, which naturally combines the notions of aggregate signature and designated verifier signature. Roughly speaking, the new concept allows to efficiently manage multiple signatures addressed to a specific verifier. And only this specific verifier needs to be convinced of the integrity and origin of the signed messages. We show that aggregate designated verifier signature schemes can be constructed in a much more efficient way than standard aggregate signature schemes. The construction that we propose employs, as basic tools, a message authentication code and the idea behind Diffie-Hellman key exchange. The security of the resulting schemes is formally proved in the random oracle model, assuming that the message authentication code is secure and that the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem is hard to solve. We also apply a similar construction to obtain aggregate designated verifier signatures in an identity-based scenario (an alternative to standard PKI, where public keys of users are directly derived from their identities).
Finally, as an example of a scenario where aggregate designated verifier signatures can be useful, we consider the case of secure routing protocols. We discuss why aggregated designated verifier signatures can be a better alternative to aggregate signatures in securing routing in mobile ad hoc networks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we recall some concepts that will appear in this work, such as aggregate signatures, message authentication codes and designated verifier signatures. In section 3 we define the new concept of aggregate designated verifier signature schemes, along with the security properties that such schemes should satisfy. We present a specific and efficient construction of such schemes in Section 4, and we provide a security analysis of the resulting schemes. We also sketch how a very similar construction works for identity-based scenarios. In Section 5, we discuss the application of aggregate (designated verifier) signatures to the authentication of routing protocols. The conclusions of the paper are given in Section 6.
Building Blocks

Aggregate Signatures
Aggregate signature schemes were introduced in 2003 by Boneh, Gentry, Lynn and Shacham [3] . Basically, aggregating signatures means compressing n signatures on n distinct messages from n distinct users into a unique (shorter) signature. This last signature is universally verifiable thanks to the signers' public keys. Thus a verifier can be provided with just one short signature rather than n, to verify whether the n users did indeed sign the n given messages. The verifier must still be provided n different public keys for verification. It is not possible to identify a misbehaving user in case of an invalid aggregate signature.
Among existing solutions, Boneh et al.'s proposal [3] is pairing-based and Lysyanskaya, Micali, Reyzin and Shacham' scheme [14] relies on trapdoor permutations. The required computations (modular arithmetic, pairing evaluations) can be too expensive for the constrained devices involved in an ad-hoc network. Lysyanskaya et al.'s paper exposes the concept of sequential aggregate signatures (which means that the set of signatures are ordered). Zhu, Bao, Li and Wu applied this concept to routing protocols in wireless networks in [22] , with still some inefficiency due to the computation complexity and length of the resulting signatures (at least 1024 bits in front of 160 bits for the scheme in [3] ).
DVS and MAC
Designated Verifier Signatures. A designated verifier signature (DVS for short) is a non-interactive variant of the designated verifier proofs introduced in 1996 by Jakobsson, Sako and Impagliazzo [11] . These non-interactive proofs have the remarkable property of being naturally non-transferable i.e. the designated verifier accepts a signature because he knows he has not produced it by himself; but as he could have generated it on his own, he cannot convince anyone else. For the same reason, these signatures do not have one of the most important properties of traditional digital signatures, namely non-repudiation (therefore, calling them "signatures" is not strictly correct).
A designated verifier signature scheme is made of a common parameter generator, two key generation algorithms, a signing algorithm and a verifying algorithm. The security requirements are the following: the scheme must satisfy the property of correctness, must be existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack, and must be source hiding. Source hiding means that an attacker, even if he knows all the secret keys, must be (unconditionally) unable to determine who from the signer and the designated verifier has produced a given signature. We will give a formal security model when presenting aggregate designated verifier signatures.
Another anonymity property capturing the concept of strong designated verifier signatures of Jakobsson et al. [11] is privacy of signer's identity, studied in [12] .
Message Authentication Code. A message authentication code (MAC) is a mechanism which provides mutual authentication between two users who share the same common private key. It consists of three algorithms: -MAC.Key: it takes as input a security parameter k and returns a key space K and a particular key K ∈ K.
-MAC.Gen: the MAC generator algorithm takes as inputs a message m and a key K ∈ K, and outputs a string of bits τ ∈ {0, 1} of fixed length.
-MAC.Verify: finally, the verification algorithm takes as inputs a message m, a key K ∈ K and a string of bits τ ∈ {0, 1} , and outputs 1 if τ is a valid MAC for m, or 0 otherwise.
With respect to security of MACs, one must prove that it is impossible to forge a valid MAC without knowing the corresponding private key K, even if the attacker has access to MAC generation and verification oracles that he can query as he wants. A bit more formally, the following game (denoted GAME 1 ) is played by a challenger and an attacker A:
1. The challenger takes a security parameter k ∈ N and executes K ← MAC.Key(k).
The key space K is given to A. 3. At the end, the attacker outputs a pair (m, τ ).
The attacker
Such an attacker A (t , ε )-breaks the unforgeability of the MAC if it runs in total time t and it outputs with probability ε a pair (m, τ ) such that MAC.Verify(m, K, τ ) = 1 and the message m has not been asked as a MAC generation query in step 2(i) of the game above. Besides this unforgeability consideration, message authentication codes also have anonymity properties. Following the terminology of [12] , MAC are source hiding. This property is trivially obtained, as a common key is shared between two users: it is unconditionally infeasible for an attacker, even if he knows the secret key, to decide who from the two users has produced a signature.
Probabilistic MAC also protect the privacy of signer's identity, meaning that it is computationally impossible to determine, given a signature and two potential signers, who is the real one, without the secret key of the designated verifier or those of the signers.
As we will see in Section 4, a MAC can be used to construct very efficient designated verifier signatures which, moreover, can be easily and securely aggregated.
Aggregate Designated Verifier Signatures
In this section, we formally introduce the new concept of aggregate designated verifier signature (Ag DVS for short) scheme. It consists of the following seven algorithms:
-Ag DVS.Setup: it takes as input a security parameter k and outputs the public parameters. These public parameters are implicit inputs of all the following algorithms;
-Ag DVS.SKeyGen: it takes as input a security parameter k and returns a pair (sk A , pk A ) of secret and public keys for the signer;
-Ag DVS.VKeyGen: it takes as input a security parameter k and returns a pair (sk B , pk B ) of secret and public keys for the verifier;
-Ag DVS.Sign: it takes as inputs a message m, (possibly) the public key pk B of the designated verifier B, and the secret key sk A of the signer A. The output is a signature σ AB ; -Ag DVS.Verify: the usual verification algorithm takes as inputs a message m, the public key pk A of the signer, a signature σ AB and the secret key sk B of the designated verifier; it returns 1 if the verification is correct, and 0 if not; -Ag DVS.Aggregate: this algorithm takes as input the public key pk B of the verifier and n [19] .
Our proposal, in Section 4, considers a different approach: the initial signatures are already designated verifier signatures, so the protocol Ag DVS.Aggregate just aggregates signatures; it need not perform any additional operation, since the designated verifier property is naturally obtained. In this way, we can implement the scheme by using MACs and obtain really efficient protocols and short signatures.
Security Model for Ag DVS Schemes
We consider the highest level of security for an Ag DVS scheme, which is obtained by combining the security models for standard designated verifier signature schemes and aggregate signature schemes. The idea is that an attacker F cannot obtain a valid aggregate signature for some designated verifier B, if he does not know the secret key sk B of B, unless he knows all the secret keys sk A i of the authors of the aggregated signatures, or the aggregated signatures themselves. The attacker is allowed to make signature and verification queries. Formally, the security is defined by the following game (denoted GAME 2 ) that the attacker F plays against a challenger:
1. The challenger takes a security parameter k and executes Ag DVS.Setup(k),
2. The attacker F receives the public keys pk A 1 and pk B . He can execute the protocols Ag DVS.SKeyGen and Ag DVS.VKeyGen by himself to obtain other pairs of secret and public keys.
3. The attacker A can make three kinds of queries: 
Constructing Ag DVS from MACs
The mathematical framework for the construction is the following. We consider a group G = g of prime order q, generated by some element g. We will suppose that the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem is hard in this group. We explain this concept with more detail. We assume that our group G is a (t CDH , ε CDH )-hard group; that is, there is no algorithm which (t CDH , ε CDH )-solves the CDH problem in G.
Our construction of the Ag DVS scheme makes use of a MAC. Therefore, we will also assume that we have a (t , ε )-secure MAC, defined by the algorithms MAC.Key, MAC.Gen and MAC.Verify, with key space K and with fixed length for the MACs produced by MAC.Gen (in existing proposals of MACs, = 160 is usually the case).
The Ag DVS scheme that we propose consists of: -Ag DVS.Setup: if the security parameter is k, then a (t CDH , ε CDH )-hard group G = g is chosen such that the order q of G is a k-bit prime number. A cryptographic hash function H : G → K is also chosen and published.
-Ag DVS.SKeyGen/DVS.VKeyGen: for each user U , a random number sk U ∈ Z * q is chosen, and the matching public key is defined to be pk U = g sk U .
-Ag DVS.Sign: given a message m, the public key pk B of a designated verifier B, and the secret key sk A of a signer A, the signature σ AB is defined to be
-Ag DVS.Verify: the standard verification algorithm takes as inputs a message m, the public key pk A of the signer, a signature σ AB and the secret key sk B of the designated verifier. It returns the bit output by
MAC.Verify(m, H(pk
Note that the result of the verification is the correct one, since pk
-Ag DVS.Aggregate: the input consists of n tuples { (
The output is the value
-Ag DVS. 
Security Analysis
We prove in this section that the Ag DVS scheme constructed in the previous section is secure, provided the employed MAC is secure and the CDH problem is hard in the group G. The proof is in the random oracle model [1] for the hash function H : G → K. This means we assume in the proof that this function behaves as a totally random function; any attacker has access to an oracle which gives consistent answers, simulating the ideal behavior of the function H. Proof. Let us assume, to the contrary, that there exists some attacker F which (t, ε)-breaks the unforgeability of our Ag DVS scheme. We are going to use F as a sub-routine to construct an attacker A which breaks the unforgeability of the employed MAC. Let us explain how this attacker A plays the corresponding game GAME 1 (recall Section 2.
Theorem 1. If the employed MAC is (t , ε )-secure and G is a (t CDH
,
2).
A's challenger takes a security parameter k and executes K ← MAC.Key(k). The key space K is given to A.
At this point, the attacker A initiates the running of the attacker F which is assumed to exist against the Ag DVS scheme. A is going to play the role of a challenger against F in the game GAME 2 (recall Section 3.1).
1. First of all, A takes a security parameter k and executes Ag DVS.Setup(k ), (sk A 1 , pk A 1 ) ← Ag DVS.SKeyGen(k ) and (sk B , pk B ) ← Ag DVS.VKeyGen(k ).
2.
A sends to F the public keys pk A 1 and pk B .
3. The attacker F can make in this case four kinds of queries (because we are in the random oracle model):
(i) a signature query for messagem; to answer to this query, attacker A asks to its own oracle (recall definition of GAME 1 ) the MAC of the messagem with respect to the unknown key K. Suppose that F asks the query H(g sk B sk A 1 ), with a probability which is greater than ε CDH . Then we have that the algorithm F can solve the CDH problem in time t + Q H ≤ t CDH and with probability greater than ε CDH . This gives us a contradiction with the fact that the group G is assumed to be (t CDH , ε CDH )-hard.
We can thus assume that F asks the query H(g sk B sk A 1 ) with probability less than ε CDH . This means that the attacker A does not stop in the queries' phase with probability at least 1 − ε CDH . In this case, the environment of the attacker F has been perfectly simulated by A. 
By definition, this is a valid designated verifier signature for the message m 1 and signer A 1 , satisfying the MAC verification equation with private key
Summing up, the attacker A obtains in time at most t+Q H ≤ t a valid forgery of the employed MAC (note that A has never queried the message m 1 to its MAC.Gen oracle). The total success probability of A is the probability that: A does not stop and F outputs a valid forgery for the Ag DVS scheme. This probability is thus greater than ( 
Therefore, we have constructed an attacker A which breaks the unforgeability of the MAC in time less than t and with success probability greater than ε . This contradicts the fact that the employed MAC is assumed to be (t , ε )-secure.
This contradiction leads to the desired result: there cannot exist an attacker which (t, ε)-breaks the unforgeability of our Ag DVS scheme.
As a consequence, we have that the probability of breaking our scheme is ε ≤ ε + ε CDH . Therefore, the scheme is secure (small value of ε) if the employed MAC is secure (small value of ε ) and the CDH problem is hard to solve in the group G (small value of ε CDH ).
Theorem 2. The proposed Ag DVS scheme is unconditionally source hiding.
Proof. This is trivial as the designated verifier shares a key g sk B sk A i with each signer A i and therefore can produce all the MACs by himself.
Identity-Based Scenarios
A very similar construction can be given for identity-based scenarios. Identity-based (ID-based, for short) cryptography was introduced by Shamir in [18] as an alternative to standard PKI-based cryptography, in order to avoid the necessity of digital certificates which link users with their identities. In ID-based cryptography, this link is automatically obtained from the fact that public keys are directly derived from the identities (e-mail or IP address, telephone number...) of the users. The main drawback of ID-based cryptography is that it requires a master entity to generate and distribute the secret keys of the users. This master entity knows thus all the secret keys of the system, so it must be fully trusted.
The boom of ID-based cryptographic protocols arrived in 2001 with the paper of Boneh and Franklin [2] on pairing-based ID-based encryption scheme. Let G 1 be an additive group of prime order q, generated by some element P , and let G 2 be a multiplicative group with the same order q. A pairing is a map e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 with some properties: it can be efficiently computed, e(P, P ) = 1 G 2 is satisfied, and it is bilinear, which implies for example that e(aP, bP ) = e(P, P ) ab = e(P, abP ) = e(abP, P ), for all a, b ∈ Z q .
The typical setup phase of an ID-based cryptographic protocol works as follows: the master entity chooses at random its secret key x ∈ Z q and publishes the related value Y = xP ∈ G 1 , along with a cryptographic hash function H 1 : {0, 1} * → G 1 . Later, when a user with identity ID U asks for his secret key, the master entity computes SK U = xH 1 (ID U ) and secretly sends this value to the user. If the verification e(SK U , P ) = e(Y, H 1 (ID U )) is satisfied, then the user accepts SK U as his secret key.
In such a scenario, an aggregate designated verifier signature scheme can be constructed exactly in the same way as explained in Section 4, with the following differences:
-the hash function will be now H : G 2 → K, where K is the key space for the MAC;
-to sign a message addressed to user with identity ID B , user with identity ID A employs his secret key SK A to compute
-to verify a signature σ AB which comes from an identity ID A , user with identity ID B can employ his secret key SK B to execute
The analysis of the properties of the resulting ID-based schemes can be done in a similar way as in Section 4.1. Now the unforgeability will be ensured assuming the unforgeability of the employed MAC and the hardness of the Computational Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem: to compute e(P, P ) abc given aP, bP, cP for random and secret integers a, b, c ∈ Z q .
Summing up, a secure and really efficient method to aggregate ID-based signatures is obtained in this way, with the restriction that aggregated signatures must have a designated verifier.
Application: Efficient Authentication of Routing Protocols
Routing protocols represent a really good example of a situation where aggregating signatures can be really useful. Finding routes to other nodes is a big challenge especially in mobile ad-hoc networks, which are very dynamic and do not have any fixed routers. Traditionally, routing protocols can be classified into two categories: proactive and reactive. Proactive routing protocols ( [7, 9] , for example) require periodic dissemination of routing information in order that all nodes are able to calculate routes to other nodes, while reactive routing protocols ( [17, 10, 6] , among others) are on-demand route acquisition systems wherein a node sends a route request (RREQ) whenever it needs to send a message to a node for which a route does not exist yet. We first explain how the aggregate designated verifier signatures can be used to secure reactive routing protocols. A node B generates a RREQ message when it wants to find a route to node A. The message is forwarded (as it is or slightly modified depending on the protocol, for example by adding the intermediate nodes that forward it). When the message reaches the destination node A, it replies with a RREP message. For example, if the route RREQ message has arrived to A throughout the route {B, C 1 , . . . , C n , A}, then the RREP message sent by A can be of the form RREP A = (RREQ received {B, C 1 , . . . , C n , A}). This message is sent to node C n , which will sign, for example, message m n = (RREQ received {B, C 1 , . . . , C n }), and so on. Finally, if B receives all these signed messages, it will be convinced that the message has arrived to the desired destination. Obviously, efficiency of such an approach can be deeply improved if each node C i aggregates its own signature to the (aggregate) signature that it receives from node C i+1 . In this way, the length of the information that arrives to node B is constant, and time required to B for verifying is also decreased. Note that, with the proposed definition for the signed messages, the information that B needs to verify the correctness of the received aggregate signature is only the route {B, C 1 , . . . , C n , A}; from it, node B can easily construct all messages m 1 , . . . , m n , RREP A .
Note that our solution with aggregate designated verifier signatures can be applied in such a situation: all nodes in the established route sign their messages by taking B as the designated verifier. A dishonest node cannot deceive B by sending a non-existing route which involves some honest node; obtaining a valid aggregate signature for such a non-existing route would be equivalent to break the security of the aggregate designated verifier signature scheme, and we have proved that this is computationally infeasible.
This solution with designated verifier signatures has a drawback: since all the signatures can be verified only by B, intermediate nodes must believe that the received signature is correct, then they sign their messages and they aggregate. In other words, the process is always executed right to the end (node B), even if there is some dishonest node in the very beginning of the chain (i.e. near A); furthermore, node B will detect that there is some problem, but it will not be able to know which node has misbehaved. On the other hand, if standard aggregate signatures are used, each intermediate node can check if the previous signature is correct: if it is, it simply signs its message, aggregates and sends the packet; if not, it can broadcast an error message, accusing the corresponding dishonest node. In real situations, however, it is not clear if this property of standard aggregate signatures is an advantage over the use of aggregate designated verifier signatures. Known proposals of standard aggregate signatures with constant-length either employ bilinear pairings [3] , which are quite highly time-consuming, or result in complicated schemes with at least 1024-bit signatures [14] . In both cases, performance and simplicity results of our proposed techniques for aggregation of designated verifier signatures are much better. When no problems happen, it is clear that our method is faster, but even if some dishonest node misbehaves, it is not clear if verifying each aggregate signature at each node will detect the problem in a faster way than by executing all the process and letting the node B verify the correctness of the final aggregate signature (specially if bilinear pairings based methods are employed, where verification of a signature is the most costly part).
Another possible drawback is the inability of nodes to authenticate existing routes due to the non-transferable property of designated verifier signatures. That is, suppose node C i has already found a valid route {C i , C i+1 , . . . , C n , A} to node A. Later, node B looks for a route to node A, and in the process the RREQ message reaches node C i . This node already has a proof (signed answer) that a valid route {C i , C i+1 , . . . , C n , A} exists. If the employed authentication process is publicly verifiable (as in standard aggregate signatures), then this proof can be transferred to node B, and the authentication process concerning nodes in the sub-route {C i , C i+1 , . . . , C n , A} must not be repeated: node B obtains the route B − A as the union of the routes B − C i and C i − A. On the other hand, if designated verifier mechanisms (which do not verify the non-repudiation property) are employed, as we suggest, node C i cannot convince any other node of the correctness of its proof, since it could have computed this proof by itself. The consequence is that the process must be repeated again for sub-route {C i , C i+1 , . . . , C n , A}, this time with node B as designated verifier. This results in an efficiency loss if all the nodes are honest, but on the other hand it can prevent a malicious node C i from cheating by claiming that there exists a valid path between itself and A when it actually does not exist.
Again, it is not clear if this apparent advantage of using standard aggregate signatures instead of aggregate designated verifier ones is really significant in practice, since node B must in any case verify the correctness of the proof for the route {C i , C i+1 , . . . , C n , A}, which means evaluating n − i times a bilinear pairing. If our solution is employed, the process is repeated again for nodes in this sub-route, but they must only sign and aggregate (which is cheaper than verifying bilinear pairings based signatures), and then the process goes on until node B, which finally verifies the correctness of the final aggregate signature. Also in mobile ad-hoc networks, nodes change their position very often; the availability of routes must be constantly updated, and so it is difficult to imagine an "old" route C i − A to be accepted by a node B in order to construct a new route B − A. In fact, proactive routing protocols seem to adapt better to this highly dynamic situations.
In Table 1 we compare a reactive routing protocol using our Aggregate DVS scheme with other secure reactive routing protocols. We mention the cryptographic mechanism employed by each protocol, resilience to tampering attacks (insertion or deletion of nodes in the path) and the computation and message size cost of implementing the security mechanism. The number of signature generations and verifications and the message size are for a route of n nodes. SRP uses only end-end authentication (only source and target nodes check the validity of the route request), and thus is vulnerable to tampering attacks by in between nodes. ARIADNE resists tampering attacks as each node verifies the earlier signature and appends its own, but requires loose time synchronization in the network. ARAN resists tampering attacks by requiring each node to verify the previous node's signature, and then putting its own signature after having removed the earlier one. SAODV requires the intermediate nodes to check the signature on the non-mutable fields of the message and the use of hash chains to resist tampering attacks, but only partially: while nodes on a certain route cannot decrease the hop count of that route, they can still keep it same or increase it. Protocol endairA requires digital signature to be added to the RREP message at each hop, resulting in large message sizes (although this could obviously improved by using standard aggregate signatures).
In our protocol each node aggregates its own designated verifier signature and the whole verification is finally done by the node issuing the route request: this formally involves O(n) operations, but they are hash evaluations and multiplications, much less costly than the O(n) operations required to verify n standard digital signatures (exponentiations, pairing evaluations...), as it happens in protocol ARAN, for example.
Aggregate signatures, in particular our solution with designated verifier ones, can also be used in proactive routing protocols. Usually, in the first phase of these protocols each node tries to find its neighbours. To do this in an authenticated way, each pair of nodes must exchange some signed messages which convince each other that there is a symmetric link between them (i.e. that each node receives the messages which are broadcast by the other node). In this phase of the proto- Table 1 : Security Comparison of reactive routing protocols col involving only two nodes, designated verifier signatures can be employed, and aggregated when more than one message must be exchanged (in current authenticated versions of OLSR [7] , for example, each pair of nodes must exchange 3 or 4 messages). For the last message that a node receives from each of its neighbours, however, the signature should be publicly verifiable (and so not a designated verifier one). In this way, this node could aggregate all these signatures coming from its neighbours, using for example [3] , and use the aggregate signature as a proof to convince the other nodes of the validity of its list of neighbours. From these proofs, tables containing the topology of the network can be constructed and used later to find valid routes between each pair of nodes. Summing up, a combination of (aggregate) standard and designated verifier signatures seems to be the optimal solution, in terms of efficiency, in order to provide authentication to proactive routing protocols.
Conclusion
In this work we have introduced the notion of aggregate designated verifier signature scheme. We have provided a general and very efficient construction of such schemes, and we have formally proved the security of the construction, in the random oracle model. The construction can be adapted to work also in identity-based scenarios.
To support the usefulness of the new constructions, we have studied how they can be applied to provide efficient authentication to routing protocols. We have compared the resulting schemes with the solutions that result from applying standard aggregate signatures, and we have concluded that both solutions have advantages and drawbacks. Therefore, the choice of the approach to use will depend on the specific application.
The conclusion is therefore that we have added a new primitive as an alternative to standard aggregation of signatures: our solution is more efficient, at the price of loosing some properties, which can be however disregarded depending on the application.
As an open problem, we can mention the possibility of proving the security of such a scheme in the standard model.
